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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the impact of product market regulation on the propensity to export at the 
industry level for 13 OECD countries and 13 industries over the 1977-2007 period. Recent 
economic policy and academic literature insists on the negative effects of product market 
regulation on productivity or innovation, and hence on “competitiveness", a term that we 
interpret as the ability to export. Similar to the conclusions of some contributions to a recent 
literature on competition and growth, the “common sense” is that product market regulation 
should be detrimental to competitiveness. Testing through a two-step estimation the impact of 
upstream pressures of product market regulation on productivity and the effect of the latter on 
the propensity to export, this paper shows that upstream regulatory pressures have a 
significantly positive impact on productivity and thereby on the capability of an industry to 
attract resources and to sell its production in international markets.  
Keywords: exports, product market regulation, competitiveness 
 
Performance à l’exportation et réglementation sur les marchés 
de biens et services 
Résumé 
 
Cet article analyse l’impact de la réglementation sur les marchés de biens et services sur la 
propension à exporter au niveau sectoriel pour 13 pays de l’OCDE, 13 secteurs sur la période 
1977-2007. La littérature académique récente comme celle portant sur la politique 
économique insiste sur les effets négatifs de la réglementation sur la productivité ou 
l’innovation et par conséquent sur la « compétitivité », que nous définissons ici comme la 
propension à exporter. Suivant les conclusions d’une certaine littérature sur la croissance et la 
concurrence, le « sens commun » est que la réglementation sur les marchés de biens et 
services nuit à la compétitivité. En testant en deux étapes les conséquences de la 
réglementation en amont sur la productivité et les effets de celle-ci sur la propension à 
exporter, ce papier montre que la réglementation a un effet significativement positif sur la 
productivité et par là-même sur la capacité d’un secteur à attirer des ressources et vendre sa 
production sur les marchés internationaux.  
 
Mots-clés : exportations, réglementation sur les marchés de biens et services, compétitivité 
JEL: F14 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of competitiveness has gone back to the forefront of policy debates on the 
importance of industry for Europe since the Great Depression (European Commission, 2010). 
A competitive manufacturing industry is seen as indispensable for a sustainable growth and 
the achievement of full employment. Facing ‘intensified global challenges’ such as the 
competition of new industrialised countries or the pressure on resources, European countries 
would need to put competitiveness and sustainability at the centre-stage of industrial policy. 
In this respect, competition policy would have to play a major role because functioning 
competitive markets would contribute to improve the international market position of 
European industries. Competition would be a driver of innovation and efficiency gains and 
create strong incentives for firms to increase productivity. Therefore the implementation of a 
competition-promoting legal environment would be a central element of an economic policy 
for the promotion of competitiveness. 
The positive influence that product market competition would play on innovation, 
productivity, or growth has been a central theme of the recent literature on growth (Aghion et 
al. 2005) and the conclusion that less product market regulation (PMR) would imply more 
innovation/productivity/growth has been promoted as a central policy recommendation by the 
OECD.2 Although the link between PMR and export performance has received little attention 
in empirical academic research, there is now a quite substantial literature on the influence of 
product market regulation on innovation and technical progress. The mainstream view 
whereby higher levels of PMR should hinder innovation, slow down productivity gains and 
hamper macroeconomic growth have actually dominated a rapidly growing policy-oriented 
empirical research that links measures of product market regulation to measures of 
productivity at the industry level (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Conway et al., 2006; Arnold 
et al., 2008; Bourlès et al., 2012). Particular attention in this literature has been paid to the 
extent to which the (usually expected) negative effect of PMR is especially pronounced at the 
leading edge in technology, the so called "world technology frontier". This is motivated, in 
fact, by a rough translation of the results in Aghion et al. (2005) who suggest that the 
relationship between product market competition (PMC) and innovation is hump-shaped and 
that the peak of this curve is ‘larger and occurs at a higher degree of competition in more neck 
& neck industries’3, that is to say in industries where firms compete at the same technological 
level. Some sort of conflation between product-market liberalisation and low profitability 
(and so competition), and between the "world technology frontier" (WTF) and "neck & neck 
industries" has implicitly been assumed to give a rationale and to structure the above 
mentioned empirical literature.4  
Elsewhere (Amable, Demmou and Ledezma, 2010, 2013; Amable, Ledezma and 
Robin, 2011; Ledezma, 2013) we have critically examined this line of argument, both 
theoretically and empirically. Knowledge standardisation consequences of PMR (Ledezma, 
2013) and leader R&D pre-emption in an otherwise standard step-by-step model without 
                                                 
2 See the various issues of the yearly publication of the OECD: Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 
3 Aghion et al, 2005; Proposition 5 
4 We use the term conflation in light of a recent wave of innovation models that focus on endogenous entry (See 
Etro, 2007 for a systematic treatment). This possibility generally leads to equilibrium market structures with a 
monopolist featuring persistently positive profits, so that low profitability and intense competition are by no 
means two faces of the same coin. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.10
innovative leaders à l'Aghion et al. (2005) (Amable, Demmou and Ledezma, 2010) have been 
put forward to highlight, and more generally to recall, the ambiguities in the theoretical 
relationship between competition, regulation and innovation.5 We have also argued therein 
that our empirical results, pointing out a positive interaction between PMR and the proximity 
to the technology frontier in determining innovation and productivity, are by no means an 
isolated finding. Although the claims differ in interpretation, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
and Conway et al. (2006) find parameters estimates of similar sign with other economy-wide 
and country level time-varying indicators of regulation.6  
In this paper we go further on these issues and test whether countries where industries 
are more regulated suffer from a technological handicap on their ability to export and 
therefore perform a lower level of export activity. We use industry-level information for a 
sample of 13 OECD manufacturing industries in 13 countries from 1977 to 2007 and rely on a 
two-step estimation strategy that seeks to explain the export share of production of an industry 
in a given country by traditional determinants of comparative advantage such as international 
differences in factor endowments as well as international differences in productivity at the 
industry level. These latter are in turn explained by product market regulatory pressures. 
Hence, in our modelling framework, PMR affects export activity through its influence on 
technical progress.  
The above mentioned debate of competitiveness cannot be treated in an underlying 
theoretical context of comparative advantage without some embarrassment.7 However no 
empirically implementable theory of competitiveness is available and we need to put some 
theoretical structure into the analysis. Hence, we interpret the word "competitiveness" in its 
fairly popular signification of "ability to export", which still has sense when the analysis is 
grounded on relative productivity measures, as we do. We rely on sophisticated estimations of 
multifactor productivity levels provided by the Groningen and Growth Development Centre, 
the construction of which is relative to the United States. We focus on the export share of 
production, which can be interpreted as both a measure of export specialisation as well as a 
measure of export performance in an international comparative analysis, once national scale 
effects are taken into account. This variable has also the highest coverage, with information 
starting in 1979.8 
The particularities of the indicator used to capture PMR give further precisions on the 
scope of the analysis. We use the regulation impact indicator of the OECD. It measures the 
impact of regulatory pressures in key input sectors on the rest of the economy accordingly to 
their use, which leads to a panel data structure that explains its wide use in the PMR empirical 
literature. As such, its most popular interpretation is that of the knock-on effect of upstream 
                                                 
5 The traditional Schumpeterian insight whereby market power provides incentives to innovate actually appears 
in most theoretical models of the endogenous growth and patent-races literatures. For Aghion et al. (2005), 
product market competition encourages innovation in a step-by-step innovation process since in a neck-and-neck 
technological competition firms will try to escape competition by innovating. However, at the same time, 
laggards' innovation will be discouraged by competition as they anticipate lower post innovation profits. As we 
argue in the above-mentioned papers, the absence of innovative activity of leaders and more generally the lack of 
analysis of entry deterrence are important neglected elements. 
6 In an error correction model, the authors claim a slowing-down effect of PMR in the natural catching-up 
process of laggard industries. 
77 See Krugman (1993) for an assertive point on this. 
8 A revealed comparative advantage indicator considering world markets is available in the STAN Indicators 
database, but only from 2000 on. Using it would imply losing information on key decades of the current wave of 
globalisation. 
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regulation on downstream industries.9 But it also presents high correlation with other more 
direct economy-wide product market regulation indicators so that the regulation impact 
indicator also remains a good proxy of business constraints (See Amable, Demmou and 
Ledezma, 2010).  
Estimations obtained with these data do not support the postulate associating less-
regulated industries with higher levels of export orientation. Rather the contrary appears: the 
pressures generated in manufacturing industries from upstream provisions appear to positively 
influence their productivity level, which in turn translates in higher export specialisation. 
Such a result recalls the ambiguities in the relationship between competition and technical 
progress and is consistent with our previously mentioned findings. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to make a link from PMR to 
technology driven comparative advantage at the industry level. Since at least Leontief (1953) 
or Balassa (1963), there is an important literature testing classical and neoclassical predictions 
about international trade specialisation. Recent empirical attempts (e.g. Harrigan, 1997; 
Redding, 2002; Nickell, Redding and Swaffield, 2008) have implemented a theoretically 
grounded empirical framework based on a GDP function derived from duality to incorporate 
both the technology and the endowment explanations of trade within the same estimation of 
GDP shares.10 This approach has also proved to be compatible for new trade theories 
(Helpman and Krugman 1985, Feenstra and Klee 2008). The link to market institutions, 
however, has received scarce attention. An exception is Nickell, Redding and Swaffield 
(2008) who, among other analysis, establish a relationship between deindustrialisation in the 
OECD and labour market institutions by relating estimates of specialisation adjustments with 
proxies of labour market protection. In our empirical framework we integrate the role of PMR 
directly in the identification strategy as an excluded variable. Moreover, GDP-shares duality-
based estimates usually require industry-by-industry identification, which yields directly 
interpretable coefficients, namely on Rybzcinsky elasticities, but does not exploit the full 
sample variance for other explanatory variables. Here, in this paper we have preferred to 
follow Romalis (2004) for an empirical strategy that considers factor endowments scaled by 
their respective factor intensity. Hence, it is possible to run full sample regressions and expect 
a positive coefficient on the composed terms of factor inputs, as the national availability of a 
production factor should positively influence trade specialisation when it is intensely used in 
the production process.11 
The other way around (the link from trade to technical progress) has also been largely 
tracked in empirical studies at several levels of aggregation. There is a large body of 
macroeconomic literature, recently surveyed by Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), 
analysing how trade openness affects economic growth at the country level. After the 
methodological criticism of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) that had tempered initial claims of 
sizeable positive effects of trade openness, recent panel data studies have provided new 
evidence on a positive correlation between trade volumes and economic growth, but generally 
after other reforms than trade liberalisation have taken place. In any case the usefulness of 
using trade volumes as proxies of trade liberalisation policies still lacks of general agreement, 
even if the problem is (partially) addressed through instrumenting strategies. At the firm level, 
                                                 
9 Indeed, recent debates on manufacturing competitiveness, in particular with respect to the France-Germany 
comparisons, have focused on the role of services (e.g. Gallois, 2012). 
10 See Dixit and Norman (1980) for a formal presentation. 
11 Nunn (2007) also follows a similar strategy to test prediction from the application of incomplete contracts to 
trade theory. 
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the empirical research is also abundant on country specific case studies testing the effects of 
trade on firm productivity.12 Recent works on this research line emphasise the heterogeneous 
responses stemming from heterogeneous firms, with a general consensus on positive effects at 
least for most performing firms.  
Although substantial, these macro and micro empirical literatures on the relationship 
between trade openness and productivity have not provided a consistent discussion on the role 
of national product market provisions. Recent papers in the PMR literature rely on firm-level 
data to explore the link between trade, national regulatory reforms and productivity. Ben 
Yahmed and Dougherty (2012) do so using micro-level data for several OECD countries. 
They test whether import penetration improves firm productivity accordingly to different 
national regulatory environments. They find negative interactions between import penetration 
and PMR at the leading edge with economy-wide indicators of barriers to entrepreneurship 
and administrative burdens. The overall effect of PMR, however, cannot be identified as the 
specification considers only an interaction term for PMR, without including it alone in linear 
form, which reflects the authors' focus on the ability of national industries to face foreign 
competition. With our modelling framework, we allow for a larger role of PMR on the 
internationalisation of countries since it is considered at the root of technology driven 
comparative advantage, while still controlling from reverse channels.  
The rest of the paper gives the details of what we have announced so far. Next section 
presents the data and methodology used; the following section discusses descriptive data 
statistics and explores reduced forms relationships. We then turn to the main estimations and 
briefly conclude in a final section. 
2. Methodology 
a. Empirical strategy 
 
Following standards theories of comparative advantage, we are interested in testing the 
following system ln(𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡) = 𝛼0 + � 𝜃𝑗
𝑗∈𝐽
𝐼𝑗𝑡 ln�𝐹𝑗� + 𝜌 ln(𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑐 + 𝜖𝑡 + 𝑢        (1) ln(𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡) = 𝛽0 + � 𝛾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐽
𝐼𝑗𝑡 ln�𝐹𝑗𝑡� + 𝛿 ln(𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑐 + 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜇           (2) 
 
Equation (2) explains an export performance measure 𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡 of country 𝑐 in industry 𝑖 
at time period 𝑡, by its multifactor productivity level 𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡 and a set of country's factor 
endowments 𝐹𝑗𝑡 that are scaled by their factor intensity in production. This latter 
transformation seeks to estimate the extent to which the increase in factor availability 
reinforces export performance in sectors that intensively use them.13 Equation (1) expresses 
that multifactor productivity 𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡 is in turn explained by factor endowments and product 
market regulation 𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡, which does not directly participate in the explanation of export 
performance. As a consequence, the identification will follow an instrumental variable 
approach where we treat 𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡 as an endogenous variable and 𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡 as the instrument 
within a two-stage ordinary least square estimation. Equation (2) will thus be exactly 
                                                 
12 See the trade related works surveyed by Syverson (2011) 
13 See Nunn (2007) or Romalis (2004) for similar identifications strategies. 
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identified, 𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡 will be the excluded instrument and factor endowments 𝐹𝑗𝑡 and other 
dummy variables will be the included instruments. We rely in fact on the hypothesis that the 
policy measure is exogenous to technical progress, which should be a good approximation at 
least in the short run of our static specification. Moreover, in the estimations that follow the 
null hypothesis of weak instruments is systematically rejected. 
With this specification we can estimate the parameters without splitting the sample by 
industry, as it would be the case if factor inputs were not scaled by their relative utilisation so 
that different Rybczynski effects would be expected to depend on the industry. In this manner 
we exploit the full sample variability of regulation environments and that of technological 
performances while controlling for factor inputs. From standard international trade theories 
we expect then 𝛾𝑗 and 𝛿 to be positive. Usual arguments postulating a positive impact of 
market liberalisation policies would suggest 𝜌 < 0, which we are about to test.  
Unobserved heterogeneity is supposed to come from the three dimensions of the data: 
country, industry and time. We consider then fixed effects for each of them. In the robustness 
checks we shall also consider individual fixed effects (one for each country-industry couple) 
in a model where national industries present specific characteristics explaining their export 
share. 
b. Data and sources 
 
We have collected data on capital assets, hours worked and value added from the EU KLEMS 
database, constructed by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC). Details on 
labour inputs are only available in the 2008 release whereas the rest of series have been drawn 
from the 2009 release, updated on March 2011.14 The sample considered in the main 
regressions potentially contains information on 13 manufacturing industries in 13 OECD 
countries for the 1977-2007 period, with main estimations varying from 3534 to 3781 
observations. The latest two years are dropped when estimations include a higher level of 
detail for labour inputs. A superior coverage can yet be obtained in pairwise descriptive 
regressions with consistent results. 
  As EUKLEMS is consistent with national accounts, we have aggregated data on total 
hours worked by persons engaged (L) and data on gross fixed capital formation (K) for the 
whole economy and used them as measures of factor endowments. In alternative 
specifications, we also consider more detailed data on hours worked by high- medium- and 
low-skilled workers (resp. HS, MS and LS). Factor intensities are proxied via the share of the 
factor compensation on value added, also available in EUKLEMS.  
EU KLEMS also provides measures of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth, but not 
of MFP levels. In order to obtain the latter, we use the GGDC Productivity Level Database, 
which gives a benchmark of MFP in levels relative to the United States for 1997. Since these 
measures need to be comparable across time, countries and industries, a specific deflation 
procedure is performed with heavy data details, especially to construct purchasing power 
parities at the industry level. For this reason MFP measures in levels are available only for the 
benchmark year 1997. Combining this benchmark with MFP growth of EU KLEMS it is 
possible, however, to reproduce MFP series in levels for our sample period.15  
                                                 
14 http://www.ggdc.net/databases/euklems.htm.  A complete description of EU KLEMS can be found in 
O'Mahony and Timmer (2009) 
15 See Inklaar and Timmer (2008 ) for details. 
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 Table 1. Main variables 
Variable Description Panel structure Source 
K Gross fixed capital formation  country, year  EU-KLEMS 
L Total hours worked  country , year EU-KLEMS 
HS Total hours worked by high skilled 
labour  
country, year EU-KLEMS 
MS Total hours worked by medium 
skilled workers 
country, year EU-KLEMS 
LS Total hours worked by medium 
skilled workers 
country, year EU-KLEMS 
Ij Factor rewards over value added j ∈ 
{ K, L, HS, MS, LS} 
 
country, industry, 
year 
EU-KLEMS 
MFP Multifactor productivity relative to 
the US 
country, industry, 
year 
EU-KLEMS & 
Productivity 
Levels 
Database 
(GGDC) 
XSP Export share of production country, industry, 
year 
OECD STAN 
REGIMP Knock-on effect of upstream 
regulation 
country, industry, 
year 
OECD 
PMR 
These data have been completed with other information from the OECD. We use the 
OECD indicator of regulation impact (Henceforth REGIMP). It informs about the "knock-on" 
effects of PMR in key input sectors (energy, transport and communication, retail and 
distribution, finance and professional services) on the rest of the economy. For each industry, 
regulation in these sectors is weighted accordingly to their use thanks to harmonised input-
output tables constructed by the OECD. Hence, a large value of the regulation impact 
indicator may be the effect of both a restrictive regulation in a particular input sector or a 
heavy use of the latter as supplier. This proxy is useful as it gives a measure of the strength of 
regulatory provisions in business operations and at the same time has the advantage of being 
available in a panel format (i.e. time-varying for each country-industry couple). 16  Finally, the 
export share of production has been obtained from the OECD STAN indicators database (v. 
2009).  
3. Preliminary analysis 
a. Data patterns 
We start with an overview of the data. Box plots in Figure 1 show the central tendency and 
the dispersion of our main variables, available on a yearly basis for each industry in each 
country.17 In order to better assess the specificity of our sample heterogeneity, the graph on 
                                                 
16 www.oecd.org/eco/pmr. See Conway and Nicoletti (2006)    
17 Each box displays the interval between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile (i.e. the interquartile range), 
with the horizontal line inside the box showing the median. The length of the vertical lines (portrayed bellow the 
lower quartile and above the upper one) are given by the so-called adjacent values. These values are computed as 
the most extreme values within an interval equal to one and a half times the length of the interquartile range. 
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each variable is displayed twice, by industry and by country, which are the most structuring 
dimensions of the data. Panels (a) and (b) present the export share of production (XSP). The 
hierarchy of countries is in conformity with expectations, large countries (the US or Japan) 
have lower and less dispersed export shares than smaller countries.  
For several countries, the export shares of textiles (17t19), electrical and optical equipment 
(30t33) as well as chemical products (24), are substantially higher in the respective country 
sample distribution. However, if one considers the country by country representation, there is 
in general one specific outlier industry exhibiting an exceptional export performance. In an 
analogous fashion, for a given industry there is in general one specific country outperforming 
the rest in relative terms, with the smaller highly dispersed countries (notably, the Netherland, 
Belgium and Denmark) being remarkable in this respect 
Panels (c) and (d) give the median and dispersion of the regulation indicator (regimpact), 
which measures the strength of downstream restrictiveness caused by upstream regulation, the 
so-called knock-on effect of upstream regulation. Clearly, considering the country specificity 
rather than the industry specificity leads to clearer data patterns, although scarcely any 
observable association between the regulation indicator and the size of the country appears. 
Interestingly, however, the top and the bottom of the country hierarchy of the export share of 
manufacturing and the knock-on effect of upstream regulation are inverted. Whereas Belgium 
appears as having the strongest average knock-on effects of upstream regulation it is the 
country featuring highest export orientation, which is also consistent with its small size. The 
opposite is true for the US. 
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Figure 1.  
Note: The figure presents box-plot graphical analysis of central tendency and dispersion of main variables by 
country and industry. See footnote (4) for further details.  
 
A similar graphical analysis is displayed for the levels of multifactor productivity (relative to 
the US) in panels (c) and (d). As can be seen, there is substantial dispersion in the levels of 
productivity according to both country and industry dimensions. The US is not on average the 
most productive country.  Some industries seem to be characterised by extreme values of the 
productivity level, in particular industries belonging to the chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel 
products (23 to 25). Some countries exhibit that pattern too, notably Ireland and UK. The 
highest multifactor productivity level in the sample belongs actually to Ireland in the chemical 
industry (24), however, excluding Ireland, this industry presents substantially less extreme 
values.  
This first descriptive analysis suggests that data patterns are heavily structured by country and 
industry specificities that should be kept in mind at the moment of explaining different export 
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industry-level orientation in our sample. The next section goes further on this by proposing an 
exploratory regression on reduced-form relationships. 
 
b. Exploratory regressions 
Before starting the main econometric analysis it is instructive to examine the empirical 
relationship between the regulatory indicator and the performance measures of export 
orientation and productivity. This analysis is done through a set of exploratory regressions 
shown in Table 2. Regression in column (1) is a simple pooled OLS regression of the (log of) 
export market share on the (log of) the product market regulation indicator. Such a bivariate 
estimation gives a significantly negative correlation, which would be compatible with the 
dominant “common sense” (Aghion and Griffith, 2005) interpretation of the negative 
influence of PMR on productivity and hence competitiveness. However, when this model is 
extended to include year dummies (column (2)), industry dummies (regression (3)) and 
country dummies (column (4)), the consequence is to turn progressively the significantly 
negative elasticity of REGIMP into a significantly positive one. Therefore, correcting for 
common shocks and heterogeneity across countries and industries eliminates the “common 
sense” negative correlation between product market regulation and export orientation. The 
same conclusion arises in a fixed-effect model assuming the unobserved heterogeneity at the 
country-industry level, that is to say, in a model where national industries present specific 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics explaining its export propensity. 
Regressions reported in columns (6)-(8) describe the empirical relationship between 
multifactor productivity and the product market regulation indicator. Consistent with the 
previous findings, the popular view portraying highly regulated environment as intrinsically 
inefficient is not found. With all the set of dummies included (column (6)) and even within a 
more exigent fixed-effect specification (column (7)) the estimated elasticities are again 
significantly positive. The last regression (column (7)) is a robust one in the sense that it seeks 
to minimise the effect of outliers, namely of those regarding the dependent variable.18 This 
additional robustness check confirms the sign of the previous estimates. 
Table 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝐹𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝐹𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝐹𝑃) 
Estimation POLS POLS POLS POLS WG POLS WG RR 
𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑀𝑃) -0.153*** 0.052 0.070** 0.219*** 0.125*** 0.335*** 0.510*** 0.453*** 
  (0.035) (0.037) (0.033) (0.041) (0.04) (0.055) (0.067) (0.045) 
Fixed-effects No Year Industry, 
Year 
Country, 
Industry, 
Year 
Individual 
(country-
industry), 
Year 
Country, 
Industry, 
Year 
Individual 
(country-
industry), 
Year 
Country, 
Industry, 
Year 
Obs. 4977 4977 4977 4977 4977 5518 5518 5518 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. POLS stands for pooled OLS regression, WG for within group estimates 
and RR for robust regression to outliers in the sample. 
 
                                                 
18 The method used performs an iterative process of assessment of outliers based on residuals which are in turn 
weighted accordingly to their magnitude (See Hamilton, 1991).  
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In the same spirit of tracking the effect of possible outliers in the previous estimates, 
the upper panels of Figure 2 plots the partial elasticity relating the regulation indicator to the 
export market share as specified by regression in column (4), which controls for country, 
industry and time fixed effects.19 This regression is run twice, including (Panel (a)) and 
excluding (Panel (b)) the Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel industry (23), the 
rubber and plastic industry (25) as well as Ireland. As previously mentioned, there we observe 
the most extreme values of multifactor productivity, performing in general more than five 
times the efficiency level of the US. Clearly, such a filter implies a significantly higher and 
more precise elasticity of REGIMP. 
 
Figure 2. 
Note: Panel (a) and (b) presents the partial elasticity of the regression of the export share of production on the 
product market regulation indicator (in log form) after controlling for time, country and industry fixed effects. 
Panel (a) considers the full sample whereas panel (b) exclude potential outliers (industry 23, 25 and Ireland). 
Panel (c) presents the estimates of the elasticity of the product market regulation indicator after performing 
quantile regressions at different percentiles of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (see Koenker 
and Hallock, 2001). 
 
                                                 
19 This is done in a two dimensional space by plotting expected conditional residuals, which is an application of 
the Frisch-Waugh theorem. 
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Finally, given the important heterogeneity in the sample, one may ask if the fit 
performed at the mean is actually representative of the relationship in other location of the 
distribution. Panel (c) in Figure 2 plots the coefficients and confidence intervals stemming 
from quantile regressions having the same specification as regression in column (4) and 
performed at different percentile of the conditional distribution of (the log) of XSP. Basically, 
these estimations seek to fit the model at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of 
the export share of production, instead of fitting at its expected conditional mean (as in a 
standard OLS). The graph also presents the OLS elasticity with its confidence intervals (the 
horizontal lines depicted in the figure). This exercise reveals that the estimated OLS elasticity 
provides a fairly representative picture of the relationship between the export share of 
production and the regulation indicator in most of the conditional distribution. 
To sum up, the “common sense” notion that product market regulation should lead to 
lower productivity and lower export orientation is not supported by this preliminary 
inspection of the data. In order to assess the robustness of these findings, we now turn to the 
estimation of the system of equation discussed above, which includes, in a more 
parsimoniously way, traditional determinants of comparative advantage. 
4. Estimation results 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the first stage equation (Table 3.a) linking 
product market regulation to productivity and for the second stage (Table 3.b) where the 
export share of production is determined by the productivity level. Six different specifications 
are considered, depending on whether all variables are considered relative to the US 
(regressions in columns (3), (4) and (6)) or not, whether the labour input is detailed according 
to the skill level (high, medium, low, presented in columns (2) and (4)) or not, and whether 
the model consider individual (country-industry couples) fixed effect (columns (5) and (6)) or 
not. 
The simplest specification is an instrumental variable (IV) regression distinguishing 
only aggregate capital and labour input (column (1)). In this estimation, the first stage results 
show a negative influence of factor inputs variables on multifactor productivity, which may 
reflect a smaller than unity scale effect or an inaccurate accounting of factor inputs, but a 
significantly positive influence of product market regulation. Recall that factor input variables 
are multiplicative terms that interact the national availability of the factor with the intensity of 
their use in production. Hence, as expected, the availability of factors intensely used in an 
industry has a positive impact on its export share of production at the second stage. Moreover, 
multifactor productivity also significantly boosts export orientation of the industry. Therefore, 
this IV estimation suggests that product market regulation has a positive influence on 
productivity, which in turns favourably impacts exports.  
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Table 3.a. First-stage estimations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃)
− 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃𝑈𝑆) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃)− 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃𝑈𝑆) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃)− 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃𝑈𝑆) 
Estimation IV IV IV IV FE-IV FE-IV 
𝐼𝐾𝑙𝑛(𝐾) -0.056*** 0.019** 
  
-0.027*** 
 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
  
(0.006) 
     
𝐼𝐿𝑙𝑛(𝐿) -0.163*** 
   
-0.130*** 
 
 
(0.012) 
   
(0.007) 
   
𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑀𝑃) 0.126** 0.398*** 
  
0.160*** 
 
 
(0.060) (0.059) 
  
(0.060) 
     
𝐼𝐻𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑆) 
 
0.167*** 
    
  
(0.051) 
      
𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑆) 
 
-0.138*** 
    
  
(0.028) 
      
𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑆) 
 
-0.008 
    
  
(0.034) 
      
𝐼𝐾𝑙𝑛(𝐾) -0.056*** 0.021** 
 
-0.033*** 
−𝐼𝐾
𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑈𝑆) 
  
(0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.006) 
    
𝐼𝐿𝑙𝑛(𝐿) -0.155*** 
  
-0.120*** 
−𝐼𝐿
𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑈𝑆) 
  
(0.011) 
  
(0.006) 
   
𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑀𝑃) 0.153** 0.415*** 
 
0.226*** 
−𝑙𝑛�𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑆� 
  
(0.060) (0.059) 
 
(0.062) 
    
𝐼𝐻𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑆) 
 
0.167*** 
  −𝐼𝐻𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑆𝑈𝑆) 
   
(0.045) 
    
𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑆) 
 
-0.147*** 
  −𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑆𝑈𝑆) 
   
(0.027) 
    
𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑆) 
  
-0.012 
  −𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑆) 
   
(0.035) 
  Fixed Effects Country, 
Industry, 
Year 
Country, 
Industry, 
Year 
Country, 
Industry, 
Year 
Country, 
Industry, 
Year 
Individual 
(country-
industry), 
Year 
Individual 
(country-
industry), 
Year 
Obs. 3781 3534 3781 3534 3781 3781 
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Table 3.b. Second-stage estimations. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃)
− 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃𝑈𝑆) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃)− 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃𝑈𝑆) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃) 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃)− 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑆𝑃𝑈𝑆) 
Estimation IV IV IV IV FE-IV FE-IV 
𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝐹𝑃) 1.778* 0.518*** 1.447** 0.479*** 1.310** 0.423* 
 
(0.909) (0.145) (0.627) (0.137) (0.581) (0.252) 
      
𝐼𝐾𝑙𝑛(𝐾) 0.115** 0.009 
  
0.035* 
 
 
(0.057) (0.009) 
  
(0.018) 
    
𝐼𝐿𝑙𝑛(𝐿) 0.303* 
   
0.181** 
 
 
(0.158) 
   
(0.078) 
   
𝐼𝐻𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑆) 
 
0.283*** 
    
  
(0.055) 
     
𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑆) 
 
0.052 
    
  
(0.033) 
     
𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑆) 
 
0.039 
    
  
(0.033) 
          
𝐼𝐾𝑙𝑛(𝐾) 0.102** 0.021** 
 
0.027*** 
−𝐼𝐾
𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑈𝑆) 
  
(0.041) (0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
    
𝐼𝐿𝑙𝑛(𝐿) 0.242** 
  
0.070** 
−𝐼𝐿
𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑈𝑆) 
  
(0.105) 
  
(0.032) 
   
𝐼𝐻𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑆) 
 
0.247*** 
  −𝐼𝐻𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑆𝑈𝑆) 
   
(0.049) 
    
𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑆) 
 
0.097*** 
  −𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑆𝑈𝑆) 
   
(0.032) 
    
𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑆) 
  
0.036 
  −𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑆) 
   
(0.033) 
  Fixed Effects Country, 
 Industry, 
Year 
Country, 
Industry, 
Year 
Country, 
Industry, 
Year 
Country, 
Industry, 
 Year 
Individual 
(country-
industry), 
Year 
Individual 
(country-
industry), 
Year 
Number of Obs 3781 3534 3781 3534 3781 3781 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Distinguishing several skill levels gives different estimations of the contributions of 
factor inputs (column (2)). In the first stage only the medium skilled labour input obtains a 
significantly negative coefficient, but high skill labour input is significantly positively 
contributing to productivity. As in the previous estimation, the coefficient of the regulatory 
indicator is substantially higher and still significantly positive. In the second stage, can be 
noted the positive contributions of capital and high-skill labour inputs, which means that 
export share are higher when these factors are proportionally heavily used in production. Here 
also, productivity favourably influences exports, but the coefficient is somewhat lower than in 
the regression reported in column (1).  
The estimates presented in column (3) take into account all variables relative to the US. 
This is done as a robustness check on the fact that the measures of productivity levels that we 
can obtain are only available relative to the US, which means that equations are more 
meaningful if expressed in relative terms. These estimates can be compared with those 
presented in column (1). Results are not substantially different. The same conclusion applies 
to regression (4), which can be compared to regression (2). One may note however that the 
positive impact of product market regulation is larger in specifications relative to the US. 
Regressions reported in columns (5) and (6) take a more precise account of heterogeneity. 
Besides time fixed effects they include individual country-industry fixed effects. Remarks 
regarding the impact of factor inputs at each stage are similar to those made with the other 
specifications. The positive impact of product market regulation is somewhat higher in fixed-
effect specifications than in the equivalent IV regressions and the impact of productivity on 
exports slightly lower.  
Overall, the conclusions drawn from these estimations are that, contrary to the 
“common sense” regarding the consequences of product market regulation, the impact of the 
latter on productivity is significantly positive, which translates in better export performance at 
the industry level. 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has analysed the impact of product market regulation on the propensity to export at 
the industry level for 13 OECD countries and 13 industries over the 1977-2007 period. Recent 
economic policy and academic literature insists on the negative effects of product market 
regulation on productivity or innovation. Since the latter can be held to be positive factors 
influencing a broadly defined “competitiveness”, the conclusion from the dominant opinion 
on that matter is that product market regulation should be detrimental to exports. The results 
of the tests performed in this paper lead to a different conclusion. Using various estimation 
specifications, it is shown that the knock-on effect of product market regulation in key input 
sectors (energy, transport and communication, retail and distribution, finance and professional 
services) has a positive influence on the productivity of industries. In turn, productivity has, 
as expected, a positive effect on the propensity to export. Therefore, the common sense 
opinion that product market regulation harms competitiveness is not supported. These results 
confirm previous findings on the influence of PMR on innovation (Amable, Demmou and 
Ledezma, 2010, 2013; Amable, Ledezma and Robin, 2010; Ledezma, 2013). 
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Table A1. List of industries 
Code   Description 
15t16   FOOD , BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 
17t19   TEXTILES, TEXTILE , LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 
20      WOOD AND OF WOOD AND CORK 
21t22   PULP, PAPER, PAPER , PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 
23      Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 
24      Chemicals and chemical products 
 25      Rubber and plastics 
  26      OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL 
27t28   BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL 
29      Machinery,  
  30t33   ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT 
34t35   TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
36t37   MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 
Note: capital letters indicate 2-digit industry aggregation 
 
Table A2. List of countries 
Code Description 
AUS * Australia 
AUT  Austria 
BEL  Belgium 
CZE * Czech Republic 
DNK  Denmark 
ESP  Spain 
FIN  Finland 
FRA  France 
GER  Germany 
HUN * Hungary 
IRL * Ireland 
ITA  Italy 
JPN  Japan 
NLD  Netherland 
SVN * Slovenia 
SWE  Sweden 
UK  United Kingdom 
USA  United States 
Note : * indicates countries without information on 
export share, but considered in the exploratory 
regression of multifactor productivity. 
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